by Peter A. Arthur-Smith, Leadership Solutions, Inc.®

“The World Series between Cubs and Indians was probably decided before the series began, owing to an unfortunate accident and second guessing of options.”

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“He said every player’s been lied to by management – or thinks they’re about to be lied to,” Epstein said. “That helped the light bulb go off. Yeah, you can get a real advantage just by being honest with your players all the time.” NY Times article, ‘Epstein and Francona Built Success by First Winning Trust’ – October 2016.

    Theo Epstein and Terry Francona were both on the same Boston Red Sox team five years ago. The former as General Manager and the latter as Player Team Manager – too bad that they couldn’t be titled Strategic Leader and Player Team Leader, respectively? They won two World Series together in 2003 and 2008. Now Francona is player team leader for the Cleveland Indians – he’s clearly more of a leader than a manager – and Epstein is the strategic leader for the Chicago Cubs – another clear leader, too. How ironic that, five years after leaving the Red Sox, they are rivals for the 2016 World Series.

Having said that, there’s one thing they both still agree upon: if you want to build trust with your players, you never lie to them. “He’s a genuine person and you can talk to him about anything,” Indians’ first baseman Mike Napoli was reported as saying. “He’s going to tell you the truth…” Francona has obviously considered his player decision options over the years – ‘Should I fudge the truth?’  ‘Should I tell him what someone else told me?’ ‘Should I be gentle-sweet with him?’ ‘Should I lie to him?’ or ‘Should I tell him the truth?’

Truth has apparently always been obvious to Francona. His father Tito, also a baseball player, mentored him that way and he has noticed how honesty has impacted his players in a positive way. It means that they don’t doubt him when in a tight spot, or when he benches them for overall team reasons. That’s why Jon Lester, a former Red Sox player with Francona and now formidable pitcher for the Cubs, also shared: “I was part of his family. I think that’s why he’s very, very good at his job, and that’s why guys love playing for him.”

Getting back onto the decision-clarity track once more, let’s now consider other ways coach Francona played his options. In Game 3 of the Indians-Chicago series – now at Wrigley Field – the Indians scored the only run in a tight game. Francona had a tough decision to make, since he had brought Andrew Miller, a devastating relief pitcher, to the mound in innings 5 and 6. Francona knew Miller was a lousy batter in a National League park and he needed a run, so he had to consider his options. Looking across at least five options, he chose to bench Miller, put on a veteran batter – Coco Crisp – and turn to another pitcher. It worked, since Crisp hit an in-field single that allowed a third base team colleague to score. That was the only run of the game for both teams.

For Game 4 Francona played his best pitcher option, Corey Kluber, again after only three day’s rest, which gave the Indians an extra edge in the early innings. He clearly had other options but had the trust of Kluber to make it work.

In Game 5, pinky-finger-nemesis pitcher, Indians’ Bauer, couldn’t hold things together in the fourth innings and was pulled-out to pass-on a two run Cubs lead to team-mate Miller. The Miller option held the line, but then Joe Maddon, the Cubs’ player leader, cleverly played his options, too – perhaps with a nudge by Epstein – by bringing in his closer Chapman for three innings and eventually maintained a one run lead to allow a Cubs’ win by 3-2.

Maddon further showed his skill as an option solver in Games 6 and 7. After gaining a good lead in Game 6, he had to reconsider his options for stopping a threatening bid by Indians’ batters. He, again, took an unusual option by calling on Chapman again for the Cubs, who closed-out four innings to keep the Indians at bay and win the game by 9-3.

He had again to consider similar options during Game 7, this time pulling Chapman, who he brought in even earlier and instead plugged-in Lester – Francona’s former top pitcher at the Red Sox – into the breach to try and hold the Indians’ charge. Even so, the Indians tied the game at 6 apiece. Shaw came in to hold the Cubs at 6 and replace Indians’ Miller, who had lost some shine by that time through allowing a home run and more.

After an unfortunate 9^th inning rain delay, which certainly didn’t help the Indians’ momentum, Shaw continued on the mound in the 10^th innings but allowed the Cubs to score two deadly runs. It was at this point Francona brought back pinky-finger-injured Bauer to close out the innings.

Maddon now responded by bringing in a relative rookie-pitcher option, Mike Montgomery, for the final innings. He had exhausted his aces. Indians closed to one run difference but couldn’t quite respond enough to bounce back once more.

It could reasonably be argued that the series was decided before the opening game because Bauer became Francona’s bogey pitcher. Bauer was normally his #2 pitcher, but he severely cut his pitching pinky-finger with a model-drone rotor he was playing with before Game 1. This put Bauer into a hole with Game 2…see below. This was bad luck for the Indians, apart from the rain delay at a critical moment in inning 9 of Game 7. Why? Because:

» Bauer had to leave Game 2 during the 3^rd innings due to his bleeding injured pinky – Cleveland lost.

» Bauer led off Game 5 and had to leave in 4^th innings to protect his injured pinky-finger – Cleveland lost.

» Francona hesitated to bring in Bauer to relieve Shaw, who was drowning in sweat in the 10^th innings of game 7, and allowed the Cubs to score the decisive two runs. Bauer at last closed them down.

Conclusion, Francona probably second-guessed his intuitive option to use Bauer more than once during the heat of the 10^th innings. It is often fatal to do this.

The important thing to appreciate about these two coaches, who have become masters at figuring-out their game options: this wasn’t a skill they evolved overnight. No doubt they assess game option scenarios in advance and therefore call upon them when the time comes; rather than do it on the fly. Like acquiring any valuable skill, be that learning how to drive, play golf, organize events, leading teams, and so forth, it makes sense to discover the basics and right techniques through a skilled professional. Once you have the right framework and disciplines, you can then develop them through dedicated practical application. Then and only then, will you become a master after 10,000 hours practical exposure. That’s the time both Francona and Maddon have put into their roles to become master player team leaders.

The moral to this interesting sporting story in option decision-making is: Sometimes the outcome is preordained through circumstances beyond our control – like a pinky-finger accident before the series. Perhaps Francona should have looked for other options from the outset? Perhaps he had no other options? With an economically strapped team, he probably didn’t have the deep bench of players that comes with a large city team. Let’s not take anything away from a Chicago team that had to endure its own growing pains, but it had many more options in talent than a scrappy, budget-conscious opponent.

Let’s see if Francona does better with his limited options next year, and let’s see what Maddon does with his player rich options now that the Cubs have reached the baseball pinnacle.

To learn more about Option Solving and decision-making, talk with: